Germany’s round. Again.

I wouldn’t say The Economist is given to alarmist journalism, but this week’s front page and main leader are, if not alarming, then certainly disquieting. Especially so for Europeans; possibly even more so for those Europeans, like PeriodOne, that live in Germany.

Few begrudged the former Communist states of eastern Europe the economic success they enjoyed and their subsequent entry into the EU. Yes, the Polish plumbers ruffled feathers (though not British ones; we were just glad that SOMEONE could repair stuff properly). Yes, Nokia destroyed its standing in Germany when it pocketed German subsidies then shifted production to Romania and Hungary. But the states themselves were implicated in these factors, not the single causes. And most people had at least a vague awareness that the fact they could afford better computers and phones was not just a result of Chinese manufacture, but also of cheap labour closer to home.

The problem is, this growth was fueled to a large extent with easy credit. And as The Economist points out, it is entirely conceivable that one of these states will default on its debt and require the kind of bail-out that we’ve become used to seeing doled out to banks and industrial sectors by governments. But this happening to an actual country? That’s something different, not least because the country’s government obviously can’t do it: that’s the point. So what happens? There are various institutions which preside over funds which could theoretically be used to prop an entire national economy – the World Band and the IMF for example. But for the new EU members – well, it’s going to be the EU. And when it comes to money, the EU mainly means Germany.

All of which isn’t that alarming, until one considers Germany’s position. During the boom years, Germans were the model of self-restraint, and had to watch Londoners and New Yorkers rake in the cash while they battled with stagnation, high-umemployment and the associated general social malaise. Despite what must have been immense temptation, successive governments resisted the urge to encourage borrowing or lean on banks to offer easier credit. Either that, or the German people simply weren’t interested in living beyond their means with quite the same alacrity as their British neighbours. In any case, reforms were pushed through – and they were painful – and it seemed as though the country might be on the mend, about to ultimately recover from the long-term trauma of already integrating a failed economy in the 90s.

So now you can understand the concern that the German people will not stand for pumping money into economies yet again. The Economist states that not to do so would be even worse (a phrase we’ve all heard a lot in recent months), and it is undoubtedly right. It just seems very unfair, and, historically-speaking, sets a precedent that encourages a ‘can’t beat them, join them’ attitude in governments whose prudent policy leaves them no better off in a crash than the cash-happy states whose lax regulation caused it.

It all adds up to a field day for populist and national political parties who offer a voice to those with a raging sense of injustice. There are, sadly, no shortage of those in Germany, and an EU state default would play right into their hands.